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 26 
Abstract: 27 
The utilization of numerical atmospheric dispersion prediction (NDP) models for assisting 28 
the emergency response to emission of radionuclides has been recommended by a working 29 
group of the Meteorological Society of Japan. This paper verifies the feasibility of the 30 
recommendation through NDP model intercomparison with limited emission source 31 
information for the case of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant accident caused by the 32 
Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. According to the recommendation of the working group, 33 
the NDP models are run under the assumption of a constant rate of emission during the whole 34 
forecast period. This is the worst-case scenario when limited source information is available. 35 
Generally, no information is provided on the temporal variability and strength of the emissions, 36 
while the source location is known. Surface air radionuclide forecasts are utilized for providing 37 
warnings of the risk of inhaling radioactive substances suspended in the low-level atmosphere, 38 
whereas column-integrated radionuclide forecasts are utilized for estimating the potential 39 
maximum wet deposition of radioactive materials on the ground due to precipitation. The NDP 40 
model short-range forecasts were validated with observational data for three locations, at the 41 
times when the most serious contamination events occurred at each of the three monitoring 42 
stations. The NDP models successfully predicted the risk of surface air contamination and/or 43 
ground surface contamination caused by wet deposition in these cases. Particularly, the NDP 44 
model forecasts allow us to disseminate warnings at effective lead times before exposure to 45 
radiation. The different NDP models gradually deviate their forecasts as the lead time 46 
progresses. The deviations may indicate the magnitude of forecast errors. Thus, the use of multi-47 
 
model forecasts is of greater benefit than the single model forecasts, because forecast error 48 
information is suggested. 49 
 50 
Highlights: 51 
We propose the use of prediction models for environmental emergencies. 52 
We performed model prediction experiments for atmospheric radionuclide dispersion. 53 
The prediction models were validated with the Fukushima nuclear accident data. 54 
Model prediction allows us to disseminate warnings at effective lead times. 55 
 56 
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 60 
1. Introduction 61 
1.1 Discontinuation of the use of NDP model forecasts for aiding emergency response 62 
The Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP) was damaged during the Great East 63 
Japan Earthquake and subsequent tsunami on 11th March, 2011, and released a huge amount 64 
of radionuclides to the atmosphere through explosions, ventilations and leaks from a broken 65 
reactor pressure vessel (Chino et al., 2011). The released radionuclides were transferred by the 66 
wind and deposited on the ground. The wet deposition seriously contaminated land, forests, 67 
houses and water, even at locations outside the urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ) 68 
of 30 km from the emission source (MEXT, 2011). On that occasion, however, the public was 69 
not provided with sufficient information on the contamination to properly mitigate their 70 
exposure to radiation. 71 
 
The World Meteorological Organization (WMO, 2006) has recommended the use of 72 
computer-based atmospheric dispersion simulations for environmental emergency response 73 
activities, including nuclear accidents. A numerical atmospheric dispersion prediction (NDP) 74 
model of radioactive substances, named the System for Prediction of Environmental 75 
Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI), was developed by the Japan Atomic Energy Research 76 
Institute as a government-commissioned project for environmental emergencies caused by the 77 
release of radioactive substances (Imai et al., 1985). In the FDNPP accident, however, forecasts 78 
by SPEEDI were not utilized for the mitigation of radiation exposure. The reason for this was 79 
that the time series of radionuclide emission intensity could not be obtained. Information on the 80 
emission intensities would normally have been provided to SPEEDI by the Emergency 81 
Response Support System (ERSS). At that time, the ERSS did not work, since its power supply 82 
was broken by the earthquake (Hatamura et al., 2011, 2012). As a result, evacuation orders were 83 
issued only by considering the distance from the emission source. In 2014, three years after the 84 
accident, the Nuclear Regulation Authority of Japan (NRA) decided to discontinue the use of 85 
SPEEDI for environmental emergencies, because of uncertainties both in the temporal variation 86 
of the emission intensity and in the weather forecasts (NRA, 2014). The Meteorological Society 87 
of Japan (MSJ) disagreed with the decision by the NRA and issued a proposal on the use of 88 
NPD model forecasts of radioactive substances accidentally released from nuclear power 89 
related facilities, based on the recommendations of a report by a working group of the MSJ 90 
(2015). 91 
 92 
1.2 Recommendation on utilization of NDP model forecasts 93 
The working group of the MSJ recommended the following approach to utilize NDP models 94 
in environmental emergencies for the mitigation of radiation exposure. Basically, NDP model 95 
 
forecasts should be provided to avoid the risk of “failure to notice” rather than to avoid that of 96 
“false alarm” by considering the worst-case scenario, because the accidental release of 97 
radioactive substances causes a risk of serious radiation exposure to many people. NPD model 98 
forecasts for the worst-case scenario can help us choose a safer time and place of evacuation 99 
and greatly reduce exposure to radiation. 100 
Generally, it is hard to obtain the time series of emission intensity just after an accident. If 101 
these data are not available, NDP models should be run assuming a constant emission rate 102 
during an environmental emergency (cf. World Meteorological Organization, 2010) with 103 
limited source information. Note that this assumption corresponds to the worst-case scenario, 104 
since breaks in the emission tend to reduce the size of the area at risk of contamination. If 105 
evacuation orders are issued under the assumption of a constant rate of emission, then the 106 
affected people are expected to be safe under any emission scenario. Of course, if a reliable 107 
emission scenario is available in real time, it should be used for the NPD model forecasts. 108 
We briefly explain the NDP model products to be disseminated to the public. One of the 109 
most serious forms of radiation exposure is the direct inhalation of radioactive substances 110 
suspended in the low-level atmosphere. To mitigate the inhalation of suspended substances, we 111 
should utilize a geographical map of radioactive substance density in the low-level atmosphere 112 
(hereafter called the surface air contamination). When surface air contamination is expected, 113 
we can mitigate the radiation exposure by advising people to stay indoors. 114 
Another exposure process arises through the deposition of radioactive substances resulting 115 
in internal exposure through the intake of contaminated water/food and the external exposure 116 
to radiation from the environment. Precipitation deposits almost all substances below 117 
rainmaking clouds on the ground. Sometimes the ground surface is heavily contaminated, even 118 
though the radioactive substance density is small in the surface atmosphere. NDP models can 119 
 
directly forecast the amount of wet deposition using the output variables of precipitation and 120 
radiative substance density. However, we do not recommend the utilization of model-derived 121 
wet deposition, since it has the risk of failing to issue a warning when the model fails to forecast 122 
precipitation. In brief, wet deposition forecasts cannot be used to predict the worst-case scenario. 123 
Instead, we recommend the use of the column-integrated amount of radioactive substances to 124 
estimate the maximum wet deposition (hereafter called the column-integrated contamination). 125 
We note that there is a possibility that the precipitation is contaminated at locations where NDP 126 
forecasts indicate high column-integrated contamination. Unless it rains at these locations, the 127 
warning associated with serious wet deposition may be withdrawn. If it does rain at these 128 
locations, we can effectively survey the contamination area by limiting only to locations where 129 
the actual precipitation coincides with high column-integrated contamination. In fact, the wet 130 
deposition can result in serious contamination over a much greater area than the UPZ of 30 km 131 
away from the emission source. We can quickly estimate the range of the contaminated area 132 
with the help of the NDP forecasts. 133 
NDP model forecasts contain uncertainty arising from imperfections in the atmospheric 134 
initial conditions and NDP models. When utilizing the model forecasts, both for the surface air 135 
contamination and column-integrated contamination, we ought to assume the contaminated area 136 
and period to be larger and longer than in the NDP model forecasts by considering the 137 
uncertainty of the forecasts. In addition, the model uncertainty could be estimated or reduced 138 
by multi-model forecasts. In this study, we perform multi-model prediction experiments to 139 
clarify the advantages of the model prediction for environmental emergencies when the 140 
emission source information is limited. 141 
 142 
2. Experiments 143 
 
2.1 NDP model forecast intercomparison 144 
We conduct an intercomparison of the NDP models to validate the NDP model performance 145 
with the observation data for the FDNPP accident, and to confirm the suitability of the 146 
recommendations by the MSJ working group. In this experiment, the reliability of NDP models 147 
is assessed on the basis of the forecast consistency among models. Multi-model ensemble 148 
approaches are used to provide information on the forecast reliability for tropical cyclone track 149 
forecasts (Goerss, 2000). Information on the forecast reliability is useful for decision-making 150 
regarding evacuation during extreme events. Here, we consider the effectiveness of multi-151 
model ensemble forecasts of NPD models. 152 
After the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, many types of NDP models have been 153 
developed to forecast the atmospheric dispersion of radioactive substances during 154 
environmental emergencies (e.g., Ehrhardt, 1997; Brandt et al., 2002; Hoe et al., 2009). After 155 
the FDNPP accident, many model intercomparison experiments have been conducted (e.g., 156 
Draxler et al., 2015; Kristiansen et al., 2016; Kitayama et al., 2018; Sato et al., 2018). However, 157 
they were all reanalysis model studies. To the best knowledge of the authors, there is no study 158 
dealing with forecast (or hindcast) model intercomparions for the FDNPP accident. Our 159 
intercomparison experiment was focused on short-range forecasts (from several hours to several 160 
days), during which the serious contamination occurred. In the FDNPP accident, radionuclides 161 
were spread over several hundred kilometers from the source over the course of about 2 days. 162 
Thus, we compared NDP models, which have domains of about 800 km × 800 km around the 163 
source position and a horizontal resolution of about 3 km. Passive tracers were released from 164 
the lowermost layer at FDNPP at a constant rate of 1 Bq/h. We need only relative concentration 165 
values when the outer edge of radioactive plumes has to be detected. This is because the 166 
background concentration of anthropogenic nuclear products is almost zero. The plume edge 167 
 
has a jump of concentration values by 1010 ~ 1020 times in model simulations even though the 168 
constant emission rate is a unit amount (1 Bq/h). It is exactly the reason why WMO 169 
recommends assuming an emission rate of 1 Bq/h (World Meteorological Organization, 2010). 170 
The definition of plume outer edges is 10-13×Bq/m3 or 10-11×Bq/m2 in this study because this 171 
definition makes a jump of concentration between the inside and outside of plumes larger than 172 
ten digits to detect the edge line of potential contaminated areas. 173 
The forecast period was 30 hours, because lateral boundary conditions for NDP models 174 
could be taken from the stored JMA’s operational mesoscale forecasts that extend to up to 33 175 
hours. The forecast products to be compared were the geographical distributions of the surface 176 
air contamination and the column-integrated amount. For the worst-case scenario, no dry/wet 177 
deposition was included in the NDP models, so that the maximum potential contamination was 178 
provided by the forecasts. While the output time interval of the NDP models is generally 179 
variable, we used hourly outputs for the model validation. 180 
In this study, four NDP models participated in the short-range forecast experiment for 181 
radioactive substances. These models were developed by the National Institute for 182 
Environmental Studies (NIES) of Japan, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), the 183 
Meteorological Research Institute (MRI) of Japan, and the French Institute for Radiological 184 
Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN). The model domains were set to cover eastern Japan with 185 
an approximately 3-km horizontal resolution. The dynamical frameworks of the NIES and 186 
JAEA models were based on the weather research and forecast model (WRF) version 3 187 
(Skamarock et al., 2008), and the initial and lateral boundary conditions were obtained from the 188 
Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) operational mesoscale analysis and forecast, respectively. 189 
The dispersion calculation of the NIES model was performed by the Community Multiscale 190 
Air Quality (CMAQ) Eulerian model version 4.6 (Byun and Schere, 2006) as described in detail 191 
 
in Morino et al. (2013) and Nakajima et al. (2017). The JAEA dispersion calculation module 192 
was a Lagrangian model, and was included in the Worldwide version of the System for the 193 
Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (WSPEEDI) used for planning the 194 
response to environmental emergencies (Terada and Chino, 2008; Katata et al., 2015). 195 
Both the MRI and IRSN models adopted a Eulerian scheme for material transport and 196 
shared the same meteorological forecasts that were prepared by MRI using the JMA non-197 
hydrostatic weather forecast model and local ensemble transform Kalman filter (JMANHM-198 
LETKF) data assimilation system (Kunii, 2014; Sekiyama et al., 2015, 2017) with JMA’s 199 
operational meteorological observations, including the near-surface wind velocities. The 200 
JMANHM-LETKF data assimilation system was implemented with a 3-km horizontal 201 
resolution, where the lateral boundary conditions were obtained from the JMA operational 202 
global deterministic and ensemble forecasts. The NDP configuration details of the MRI model 203 
were described in Sekiyama et al. (2017) and Kajino et al. (2018), in which the model 204 
performance was quantitatively examined. The JMANHM-LETKF meteorological field was 205 
also used to drive the offline NDP model of IRSN. The dispersion calculation for the IRSN 206 
model was detailed in Mathieu et al. (2012; 2018), Saunier et al. (2013), Groëll et al. (2014), 207 
and Quérel et al. (2015). For Eulerian NPD models (NIES, MRI, and IRSN models), the time 208 
series of contamination at each monitoring station was extracted by the linear interpolation of 209 
the nearest grid cells. For a Lagrangian NPD model (JAEA model), the gridded output was 210 
calculated from the particle density and then the time series was extracted by the linear 211 
interpolation of the nearest grid cells. 212 
 213 
2.2 Monitoring data for validation 214 
 
Three cases were chosen to assess the performance of NDP model forecasts. Figure 1 shows 215 
the time series of the air dose rate and precipitation intensity at the Iwaki and Fukushima 216 
monitoring stations (Working group of MSJ, 2015) for validating the model forecasts. At Iwaki 217 
station, the most serious event occurred in the early morning on 15th March. The air dose rate 218 
suddenly increased to more than 20 µSv/h in the early morning, and then rapidly decreased to 219 
less than 2 µSv/h around noon. The high level of radiation mostly came from a radioactive 220 
plume in the low-level atmosphere (cloud shine). It did not come from deposited substances on 221 
the ground (ground shine), because no precipitation was observed at Iwaki. 222 
At the Fukushima monitoring station, the most serious event occurred in the evening on the 223 
15th of March. Around 1700 JST, the air dose rate rapidly rose to about 20 µSv/h at the same 224 
time of precipitation was observed as shown in Fig. 1. Since the air dose rate did not rapidly 225 
return to the normal value, the radiation is considered to come from substances deposited on 226 
the ground (ground shine). If it had not rained, the radioactive substances would not have 227 
contaminated the ground so much. The large amount of wet deposition resulted from the 228 
spatiotemporal overlap of the precipitation with the column-integrated contamination. After the 229 
16th of March, the radiation gradually decreased in accordance with the volatilization and decay 230 
of iodine’s isotope, 131I, whose half-life is about 8 days, and partly due to soil infiltration of 231 
radioactive metal ions. 232 
Kashiwa city in the Kanto area was also contaminated as shown in Fig. 2 (Working group of 233 
MSJ, 2015). At the Kashiwa Campus of the University of Tokyo, the air dose rate increased 234 
between the evening of the 20th and the morning of the 21st of March, and remained constant 235 
afterwards. Precipitation was observed from 0800 JST on the 21st at the nearest Automated 236 
Meteorological Data Acquisition System 9 (AMeDAS) observation station at Abiko. It is likely 237 
that precipitation deposited radioactive substances on the ground at that time. 238 
 
Detailed observations exist for the above-mentioned contamination events at the Iwaki, 239 
Fukushima and Kashiwa stations, and thus these events were selected as the targets of the model 240 
intercomparison experiment. The locations of these stations are illustrated in Fig. 3. The Iwaki 241 
station is located about 40 km SSW from the emission source at FDNPP, the Fukushima station 242 
is located about 60 km NW, and the Kashiwa station is at about 200 km SSW. In addition, we 243 
were able to acquire the ground surface concentration data of radioactive cesium (Oura et al., 244 
2015) in Kashiwa city very close to the Kashiwa station. 245 
 246 
3. Results and Discussion 247 
3.1 NDP model forecasts for surface air contamination at Iwaki and Kashiwa 248 
At first, the NDP model intercomparison was conducted with a focus on the maximum air 249 
dose rate observed at the Iwaki monitoring station. The NDP models were initialized at 0000 250 
JST on March 15th, where radioactive substances were assumed to be emitted at a constant rate 251 
from the same initial time, 0000 JST. As mentioned above, the high level of radiation observed 252 
at Iwaki is considered to come from the plume suspended in the low level atmosphere (cloud 253 
shine). Therefore, the forecasts of the surface air contamination are validated with the 254 
observations at Iwaki. As shown in Fig. 4, all four models forecast a dense plume moving SSW 255 
which extended over Iwaki at a forecast time of 6 hours (FT=6). After that, the surface wind 256 
gradually turned clockwise and the plume moved away from Iwaki. At a forecast time of 30 257 
hours (FT=30), the models again forecast a low-level plume moving southward and air 258 
contamination around the Iwaki station. These forecasts are consistent with the monitoring 259 
results of a large peak in the air dose rate in the early morning of the 15th of March, and a 260 
moderate peak in the early morning of the 16th (see Fig. 1), although NDP models have larger 261 
differences in the geographical distributions at a forecast time of 30 hours than at a forecast 262 
 
time of 6 hours. Figure 5 shows the vertical east-west cross section of the radioactive substance 263 
density along a line of the latitude of Iwaki (37.05º N). The vertical extension of radioactive 264 
substances is somewhat different among the models, which may reflect the magnitude of the 265 
vertical diffusion. Nevertheless, the density forecasts all show a maximum in the lowermost 266 
layer. 267 
Time series of the NDP forecasts consistently indicate the maximum contamination occurred 268 
at the Iwaki station in the early morning of the 15th, as illustrated in Fig. 6a. Strictly speaking, 269 
the forecast time of the radioactive substances was about two hours later than the observed time. 270 
One of the reasons for this may be that the initialization time of the emissions in NDP models 271 
of 0000 JST was later than the actual emission time of the substances which arrived at the Iwaki 272 
station. In this case, the forecast times of 3–6 hours are too short for us to take preventive action. 273 
An additional experiment was conducted to increase the lead time up to 24 hours using the MRI 274 
model (Fig. 6b). Although the forecasts contained more uncertainty, depending on the initial 275 
time they predicted the air contamination within an error of 2 hours over Iwaki on the morning 276 
of the 15th of March. As shown in Fig. 6a, the maximum surface air contamination differed 277 
between models, and the forecast spread (≈ 1.5×10-11Bq/m3) was more than 50 percent of the 278 
ensemble mean value (≈ 2.5×10-11Bq/m3), suggesting a fair amount of uncertainty in the 279 
forecasts. In the time series of the surface air contamination, relatively greater values indicate 280 
the periods when there is a high risk of inhalation of dangerous levels of radiation with a 281 
valuable lead time. 282 
The radioactive plume shown in Figs. 5 and 6 flowed southward and arrived at Kashiwa 283 
about seven hours later (Fig. 7). The forecast time of the radioactive substances in Kashiwa was 284 
about two hours earlier than the observed time as shown in Fig. 7a. This case involves a longer 285 
forecast lead time and a farther distance from the emission source than the case of Iwaki. 286 
 
Therefore, the time-lagged ensemble (Fig. 7b) indicates larger errors of the plume arrival time 287 
when the forecast initial time is earlier than 0000 JST on 15th March. Generally speaking, the 288 
uncertainty in plume advection simulations is accumulated along the pathway of the plume; i.e., 289 
small differences in the wind velocity along the pathway may cause large differences in the 290 
plume location (Sekiyama et al., 2017). Therefore, especially when the forecast initial time is 291 
earlier and the lead time is longer, we ought to prepare for the slightly longer time window and 292 
broader area of air contamination than the model forecasts. 293 
 294 
For these events, NDP models indicate the possibility that the surface air would be 295 
contaminated with radioactive substances at Iwaki and Kashiwa on the mornings of the 15th 296 
and 16th, as a worst-case scenario. If people were informed of the possible risk of the surface 297 
air contamination on the mornings of the 15th and 16th, they could remain indoors until the 298 
contaminated surface air had passed. In other words, the models indicated that the health risk 299 
from surface air contamination would be smaller in other time periods, because the models 300 
assumed a continuous rate of emission after initialization without any emission breaks. 301 
 302 
3.2 NDP model forecasts for wet deposition at Fukushima City 303 
Next, NDP model forecasts are validated with the observations at the Fukushima monitoring 304 
station. As mentioned above, precipitation caused a large amount of wet deposition at about 305 
1700 JST on the 15th of March, and thereafter radionuclides deposited on the ground continued 306 
to emit radiation. 307 
In the worst-case scenario for wet deposition, the precipitation deposits all of the column-308 
integrated radioactive substances on the ground. Here, we examine whether NDP model 309 
forecasts of the column-integrated contamination correctly predicted the possibility of wet 310 
 
deposition on the ground. Figure 8 shows NDP model forecasts of the column-integrated 311 
amount of radioactive substances initialized at 0000 JST on March 15. Note that these are the 312 
same forecasts as shown previously. The spatial pattern of the vertically integrated amount 313 
shown in Fig. 8 is significantly different from that of the surface air contamination shown in 314 
Fig. 4, reflecting the vertical wind shear. At 1800 JST (FT=18), the area of the contaminated 315 
column shown in Fig. 8 is much greater than the area of contaminated surface air shown in Fig. 316 
4. According to a detailed tracer flux analysis (Sekiyama and Iwasaki, 2018), radioactive 317 
substances emitted from FDNPP passed over Fukushima City around 1800 JST through two 318 
routes. The first route was that of the substances emitted early in the morning, which went 319 
southward, turned clockwise and then moved northeastward. These substances gradually rose 320 
while moving northeastward, and reached a height of about 3000 m. They were dispersed 321 
horizontally under the strong wind shear. The second route was that of the substances emitted 322 
in the afternoon, which went northwestward directly to Fukushima City. Large differences in 323 
the distribution of potential contamination among the four NDP models were not found in Fig. 324 
8 as far as the short-range (30-hour) forecasts are concerned. Stacked bar charts in Fig. 9b shows 325 
the similarity degree of the potential contamination area among the four NDP models depicted 326 
in Fig. 8. If the stacked bar charts are exclusively colored with “1-Model Only” then the 327 
potential contamination areas are completely non-overlapped among the four NDP models. In 328 
contrast, stacked bar charts with a 100% proportion of “4-Model Ovlp” indicates the perfect 329 
match of the four NDP models. Figure 9b illustrates a large similarity (but a moderate 330 
difference) among the four NDP models with a small portion of “1-Model Only” areas. The 331 
forecast similarity in Fig. 9b (related to Fig. 8) is higher than that in Fig. 9a (related to Fig. 4) 332 
because the distribution of contamination in Fig. 8 is column-integrated, which is apt to mask 333 
 
the difference in vertical diffusion between models, while that in Fig. 4 illustrates only the 334 
surface layer. 335 
Figure 10 is the vertical cross section of the substance density along a line of the latitude of 336 
Fukushima City (37.76º N). The contaminated air extended up to an altitude of about 3000 m. 337 
The upper portions of the contaminated air were emitted in the early morning, and widely 338 
dispersed by the wind shear. The lower portions of relatively dense radioactive substances were 339 
mainly emitted in the afternoon. The NDP models forecasted the low-level air contamination 340 
to be lower at Fukushima City than that at Iwaki, under the assumption of a constant emission 341 
rate. The risk of internal exposure by inhalation at Fukushima City might be much less than 342 
that at Iwaki 12 hours earlier. On the other hand, the large column-integrated amount indicated 343 
the risk of wet deposition around Fukushima City in the evening. Indeed, as shown in Fig. 1, 344 
the precipitation caused the wet deposition and the ground contamination at the Fukushima 345 
station. Figure 11 shows that the precipitation started around 1400 JST (FT=14) and the surface 346 
contamination mainly occurred at about 1700 JST (FT=17). The NDP models forecasted that 347 
the radioactive plume would be widely spread over Fukushima City at about 1800 JST (FT=18). 348 
Note that previous studies have indicated that the reproducibility of the northwestward wind 349 
from the nuclear power plant to Fukushima City is not good in the afternoon 15th of March (e.g., 350 
Morino et al., 2013; Sekiyama et al., 2015; Nakajima et al., 2017), attributable to the orographic 351 
model resolution or boundary conditions. This type of meteorological uncertainty cannot be 352 
completely removed by the ensemble forecast or proper use of NDP models. Nonetheless, in 353 
Fig. 11, one ensemble member (JAEA model) was able to predict the contamination arrival 354 
time more accurately than other members. This indicates the benefit of the model ensemble 355 
forecast. 356 
 
If the column-integrated contamination forecasts had been available, we could have prepared 357 
for contaminated precipitation in the region of high column-integrated contamination. If it rains 358 
in the region where a large column-integrated amount is forecasted, residents can be warned 359 
not to use rainwater to avoid internal exposure, and check the contamination of the rainwater. 360 
If it does not rain, we can withdraw the wet deposition warning. 361 
 362 
3.3 NDP model forecasts for wet deposition at Kashiwa 363 
 Although Kashiwa is located about 200 km SSW of FDNPP, significant contamination on 364 
the ground was recorded due to the wet deposition around 0800 JST on the 21th of March as 365 
shown in Fig. 2. All of the NDP model forecasts indicated that the tongue of the radiative plume 366 
passed over Kashiwa at this time as shown in Fig. 12. The forecasted arrival times of the plume 367 
by the NIES and JAEA models were a little earlier than those by the MRI and IRSN models. 368 
This is probably because these NDP forecasts are coupled with different mesoscale numerical 369 
weather prediction (NWP) models. The former two models implemented the WRF model, 370 
whereas the MRI implemented the JMA non-hydrostatic weather forecast model (JMANHM). 371 
The IRSN model was an off-line transport model, and was driven by the same meteorological 372 
parameters from the JMANHM. Nonetheless, there are no large differences in the distribution 373 
of contamination among models as shown in Fig. 9c which indicates a higher similarity than in 374 
Fig. 9b. 375 
Similar to Fukushima City, if the above forecasts had been available, people in Kashiwa 376 
would have been able to prepare for the contaminated precipitation. We should survey the 377 
ground contamination due to wet deposition only when precipitation occurs in the forecasted 378 
regions of high column-integrated contamination. It is not necessary to survey the ground 379 
contamination in the non-precipitation area. Thus, we can quickly determine which areas are at 380 
 
risk of ground contamination by considering only the areas both experiencing precipitation and 381 
predicting column-integrated contamination. 382 
 383 
4. Conclusions 384 
4.1 How to utilize NDP models for environmental emergencies 385 
All four NDP models succeeded in forecasting the three-dimensional distribution on short 386 
time scales for the three locations considered here. The NDP models have the potential to 387 
provide useful information to the public on the surface air contamination and column-integrated 388 
contamination even if the emission inventory information is not available. The surface air 389 
contamination forecasts can be utilized for mitigating the inhalation of radioactive substances, 390 
and the column-integrated contamination forecasts for mitigating the radiation exposure 391 
associated with the wet deposition. Note that the column-integrated contamination is the worst-392 
case scenario for wet-deposition. As with all natural hazard forecasts, the greatest benefit of 393 
using forecasts is the increased lead time at which warnings can be provided, giving more time 394 
to prepare. 395 
Accurate observational data are also valuable for preparing preventive measures against 396 
nuclear disasters. Emergency systems based only on observations, however, may not be able to 397 
provide timely information. Also, the use of observations only incurs the risk of unobserved 398 
contamination because of coarse spatial distributions when there are insufficient stations 399 
available. For example, precipitation can significantly contaminate the ground surface even far 400 
away from the emission source, where it is difficult to deploy observatories enough to depict 401 
the whole contaminated area. Emergency systems should be established to effectively survey 402 
the contamination due to wet deposition on the ground over wide areas. The utilization of the 403 
NDP models helps us to reduce the radiation exposure by considering the match of the predicted 404 
 
plume with the observed precipitation. For determining preventive actions, we should use 405 
information from both the observations and forecasts (WMO, 2006). 406 
 407 
4.2 Recommendation 408 
The reason why the NRA discontinued the use of NDP model forecasts for environmental 409 
emergencies was that both the time-dependent emission scenarios and weather forecasts contain 410 
considerable uncertainties. According to them, model forecasts can hardly be used 411 
quantitatively, for example, compared with the threshold density values, to issue evacuation 412 
orders. Thus, we recommend using model forecasts for qualitative indications of the worst-case 413 
scenario, which can help us choose a safer time and place of evacuation and greatly reduce 414 
exposure to radiation. The assumption of emission rate constancy provides the worst-case 415 
scenario when limited source information is available. Under the constant emission scenario, it 416 
does not matter what absolute values of emission are used in NDP models because the 417 
hazardous plumes can be discriminated with a huge gap of concentration in the model 418 
simulations. 419 
On the other hand, NDP model forecasts also have uncertainties arising from the forecasts of 420 
dynamic and thermodynamic fields. If these meteorological fields are inaccurate, then the 421 
location of safe areas may not be safe even though the NDP model forecasts suggest it is. The 422 
differences in the vertical diffusion schemes between models result in differences in the vertical 423 
distributions of the contamination and subsequently the horizontal distributions. The 424 
intercomparison experiment, however, did not find large differences in the distribution of 425 
contamination among models, as far as the short-range (30-hour) forecasts are concerned. The 426 
consistency among different model forecasts indicated that short-range forecasts were reliable 427 
enough to detect qualitatively hazardous areas. However, as mentioned above, we ought to 428 
 
consider the risk of contamination to be slightly broader and longer than forecasted, considering 429 
the uncertainty in the meteorological fields. 430 
Finally, we recommend the use of various ensemble techniques to improve the reliability of 431 
the NDP forecasts, for example, the time-lagged ensemble method (cf. Figs. 6b and 7b), in 432 
which outputs from different initialization times provide us with reliable forecasts and the 433 
approximate magnitude of forecast errors. The multi-model ensemble also should be utilized to 434 
illustrate the forecast uncertainties and provide the extended hazardous time and areas as shown 435 
in this study. Nowadays, many operational NWP centers provide ensemble weather forecasts 436 
using perturbed initial conditions, whose products can also be used for the initial and lateral 437 
boundary conditions of NDP models (cf., Kajino et al., 2018). The NDP model intercomparison 438 
experiment strongly indicated the effectiveness of multi-model ensemble techniques in this 439 
study. We hope that the multi-model ensemble techniques will be used not only for the 440 
reanalysis of the nuclear accident (e.g., Draxler et al., 2015; Kristiansen et al., 2016; Kitayama 441 
et al., 2018; Sato et al., 2018) but also for a forecast (or hindcast) purpose. The uncertainty of 442 
numerical weather forecasts still remains especially for ground surface wind because the wind 443 
in the planetary boundary layer (PBL) strongly depends on the orographic reproducibility in the 444 
model. Therefore, we sincerely expect the model resolution of operational weather forecasts to 445 
be heightened to reduce the uncertainties of the PBL wind and NPD forecasts. 446 
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 600 
Fig. 1. Time series of the hourly air dose rate (red line, µSv/h) and precipitation (black bars) at 601 
monitoring stations in Iwaki city (140.88 ºE, 37.05 ºN, upper panel) and in Fukushima city 602 
(140.47 ºE, 37.76 ºN, lower panel), hourly from March 14 to 31, 2011, respectively. 603 
Precipitation was observed at the Onahama AMeDAS station, which is about 12 km southeast 604 
of the Iwaki station, and at the Fukushima Local Meteorological Observatory, which is about 1 605 
km from the Fukushima monitoring station. This figure was reproduced from an earlier study 606 
(Working group on “Radioactive substances accidentally released from nuclear power related 607 
facilities”, Meteorological Society of Japan, 2015) for validation of model results. 608 

















































































































Fig. 2. Time series of the hourly air dose rate (red lines, µSv/h) at the University of Tokyo 611 
Kashiwa Campus and precipitation (black bars, mm/h) at Abiko AMeDAS station, which is 612 
about 8 km from the monitoring station, from 0000 JST 17th to 0000 JST 26th, March. The air 613 
dose rate was observed with a NaI(TI) scintillation detector at a height of 1 m. Observations 614 
were only made in the day time. This figure was reproduced from an earlier study (Working 615 
group, Meteorological Society of Japan, 2015) for validation of model results. 616 

























































Fig. 3. Locations of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (FDNPP), and the Fukushima, 619 
Iwaki, and Kashiwa monitoring stations. Gray shading indicates the ground elevation at 620 
intervals of 250 m. 621 








Fig. 4. Geographical distributions of the surface air contamination forecasts (concentration of 624 
radioactive substances in the lowermost layer; 10-13×Bq/m3) from the model initialization time 625 
of 0000 JST on 15th of March at forecast times of 6, 12, 18, 24 and 30 hours, by the NDP models 626 
of the NIES, JAEA, MRI and IRSN. A constant emission rate of 1 Bq/h at FDNPP is assumed 627 
in the forecasts. The triangle, diamond, and pentagon indicate the locations of Fukushima City, 628 
Iwaki, and Kashiwa, respectively. 629 

























Fig. 5. East-west and vertical cross sections of the 6-hour forecasts of the air contamination 633 
along a line of the latitude of Iwaki (37.05º N) from the initialization time of 0000 JST on 15th 634 
March by the four models (unit; 10-13×Bq/m3). A constant emission rate of 1 Bq/h at FDNPP is 635 
assumed in the forecasts. Open triangles indicate the longitude of Iwaki (140.9º E). 636 


















Fig. 6. Time series of the surface air contamination forecasts (units; Bq/m3) together with the 639 
observations of air dose rate (unit; µSv/h) at the Iwaki station. The upper panel (a) shows 640 
forecasts from the initialization time of 0000 JST on 15th March by the NDP models at NIES, 641 
JAEA, MRI and IRSN, and the lower panel (b) shows the lagged forecasts by the MRI model. 642 
The lines for each forecast and observation are indicated in the legend. A constant emission rate 643 
of 1 Bq/h at FDNPP is assumed in the forecasts. 644 

























































































































Fig. 7. Same as Fig. 6, but at the Kashiwa station; the observation is ground surface Cs-137 647 
concentration (Oura et al., 2015), not air dose rate. 648 
  649 
(a) Model Ensemble













































































































Fig. 8. Same as Fig. 4 but for the column-integrated contamination forecasts (10-11×Bq/m2). 651 
























Fig. 9. Overlapped and distinct plume areas (km2) between the four NDP models at forecast 654 
times (FT) of 6, 12, 18, 24, and 30 hours within the latitude 35.5º N – 39.0º N and longitude 655 
138.0º E – 142.0º E. In the legend, 4-Model Ovlp, 3-Model Ovlp, 2-Model Ovlp, and 1-Model 656 
Only indicate the area where all the four NDP model plumes are overlapped, the total area 657 
where three out of the four NDP model plumes are overlapped, the total area where two out of 658 
the four NDP model plumes are overlapped, and the total area where only one plume exists (= 659 
non-overlapped with any others), respectively. (a) Statistics related to Fig. 4 with the plume 660 
edge definition of 10-13×Bq/m3, (b) related to Fig. 8 with the plume edge definition of 10-661 
11×Bq/m2, and (c) related to Fig. 12 with the plume edge definition of 10-11×Bq/m2. 662 
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 664 
Fig. 10. Same as Fig. 5 but for the 18-hour forecast along a line of the latitude of Fukushima 665 
City (37.76º N). Open triangles indicate the longitude of Fukushima City (140.5º E). 666 















Fig. 11. Time series of the column-integrated contamination amount forecasts (unit; Bq/m2) 669 
together with the observations of air dose rate (unit; µSv/h) at the Fukushima station. A constant 670 
emission rate of 1 Bq/h at FDNPP is assumed in the forecasts. 671 
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